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Case Notes

Admiralty-Jones Act-Longshoremen's Act-Exclusive Remedy-Biggs v.
Norfolk Dredging Co., 360 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1966).

IN JULY OF 1961 ORVNER BxOGs, an employee of the Norfolk Dredging Co., was injured while working aboard his employer's barge on the Elizabeth River. He immediately received compensation payments under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act,' but when the payments were stopped, Biggs obtained an award from
the Virginia Industrial Commission ordering their reinstatement. Samuel Clowers,
an employee of a bridge building contractor, 2 suffered a crushed foot while debarking onto a bridge piling from his employer's commuter vessel. After receiving compensation under the Virginia statute, 3 he obtained an award for benefits under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 4 Both Biggs and Clowers
then brought suit against their respective employers, alleging that they were hurt
while working as seamen and therefore entitled to recover under the Jones Act 5 or
on the warranty of seaworthiness under general maritime law. 6 The District Court
granted summary judgment for the defendant employer in each case. 7 Because the
Longshoremen's Act and the Virginia Compensation Act have exclusive remedy provisions,8 the court determined that an award under these acts constituted a bar to
further actions against an employer, based on the remedies available to seamen. 9
Consolidated on appeal for the determination of that single issue, the Court of Appeals vacated both judgments and remanded the actions to the trial court, holding

1

§ 65-1 (1950).
This suit was brought against the defendant on a joint venture theory. The action was
not properly maintained and, if pressed, motion to quash would probably have been sustained. Clowers v. Tidewater-Raymond-Kiewit, 237 F. Supp. 1015-16 & n. 1.
VA. CODE ANN. tit. 65,

2

8

Supra note 1.

'44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
5
Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
Under general maritime law an injured seaman, once he proves an injury caused by an
unseaworthy condition existing on the vessel, may recover without proof of negligence on the
part of the vessel's owner. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
'Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 237 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Va. 1965); Clowers v. TidewaterRaymond-Kiewit, 237 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Va. 1965).
8 Longshoremen's Act, supra note 4, § 905; Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act, supra
note 1, § 65-37.
' Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Co., supra note 7, at 596-97. "Whether the circumstances of
this case are such that we deem it res judicata, estoppel, accord and satisfaction, or waiver
is not of great importance. We hold the plaintiff is barred from now seeking relief as a seaman
in an action under the Jones Act." In reaching this result the court relied heavily on Hagens
v. United Fruit Co., 135 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1943).
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that the appellants were entitled to seamen's remedies, notwithstanding the awards
of compensation, if they could show themselves to be members of that class. 10
Permitting the claimants to seek further remedies against their employers is directly contrary to the provisions of the Longshoremen's Act. 1 That federal statute
2
expressly includes within its scope all those engaged in maritime employment,' except the master and crew members of a ship,' 8 and makes recovery under its provisions the exclusive remedy of the injured against his employer. 14 The court has permitted the appellants to pursue recovery on the warranty of seaworthiness or the
Jones Act and has based its decision of the principle of avoiding a harsh and incongruous result.1 5
Traditionally, seamen have been protected as wards of admiralty. A seaman injured in the service of his ship was entitled to wages, maintenance, and cure at least
until the end of the voyage, without reference to the question of negligence, and to
indemnity when his injuries resulted from the unseaworthiness of the ship.O In 1920
Congress passed the Jones Act, by which "seamen" were given the right to sue for
damages at law for personal injuries, "and in such action all statutes of the United
States modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal
7
injury to railroad employees shall apply."'
The scope of the term "seaman," as used by Congress, became an issue in International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty.1s The Supreme Court held that a longshoreman, injured while loading a ship, could maintain an action against his employer
as a seaman under the Jones Act. The Court reasoned that since the plaintiff's work
was a maritime service formerly rendered by the ship's crew, the remedy available
to him should not vary with the accident of his being employed by a stevedoring contractor rather than by the shipowner. 19
When Congress passed the Longshoremen's Act in 1926, the word "seaman" took
on a new ambiguity. This legislation was deemed to have superseded the Jones Act
21
in regard to longshoremen and harbor workers, 20 as construed in the Haverty case,
by providing compulsory compensation for that group and by making it the exclusive
remedy against the employer.2 2 Therefore "seamen" as used in the Jones Act meant
10

Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 360 F.2d 360, 365 (4th Cir. 1966).
note 4, § 905.
22Supra note 4, § 903 (a). Compensation is payable under this act when the death or disability accrues on the navigable waters of the United States or any dry dock, if recovery
through workmen's compensation proceedings is not provided for by state law.
13Also excluded from coverage of the act are persons hired by the master to load, unload,
or repair a small vessel under eighteen tons net, government employees, and persons whose
injury resulted solely from intoxication or from the willful intention of the employee to injure
himself or another. Supra note 4, § 903 (a)-(b).
1,
Supra note 4, § 905.
15Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Co., supra note 10, at 365.
10See note 6 supra.
17 Supra note 5. This legislation made the Federal Employers' Liability Act applicable to
seamen.
- 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
1IId. at 52.
21Panama Agencies v. Franco, Ill F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1940).
11Supra note 18.
21Supra note 4, §§ 903, 905.
11Supra
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only the master and crew members of a ship.2 3 They alone are entitled to maintain
a Jones Act suit.24
The Longshoremen's Act, however, overruled the Haverty decision only with respect to its permitting a Jones Act suit by a longshoreman.2 5 The holding in that case,
that a longshoreman is a seaman by reason of the duties of his employ, is still good
law. 26 The reason for this is that the Longshoremen's Act expressly provides an injured employee with the right of election to sue a third party rather than take com27
pensation from his employer, when such third party was responsible for the injury.
The Supreme Court preserved for longshoremen the maritime remedy of libeling the
vessel in rem on the warranty of seaworthiness, by continuing to regard them as seamen, in this kind of third party suit.2 8 In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, the majority
stated that those engaged in the traditional work of seamen are entitled to the protections traditionally afforded seamen, and a shipowner cannot escape liability to
those who do the vessel's work by bringing an intermediary contracting employer
29
between himself and those workers.
Congress had attempted to achieve a balance in the law protecting maritime workers. The injured crew member could sue his employer for negligence under the
Jones Act and could libel the ship for unseaworthiness, but was excluded from compensation benefits. The injured harbor worker3 O was covered by the federal compensation statute, with the right of election to sue a third party shipowner on the warranty of seaworthiness, but the exclusive remedy clause denied him Jones Act rights
against his employer.3 1
In the principal case the court has held that if the claimants can show themselves
to be seamen, they are entitled to maintain an action for unseaworthiness, despite
8South Chicago Coal & Dry Dock Co. v. Basset, 309 U.S. 251, 256 (1940).
PABraner v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 46 F. Supp. 302 (E.D.N.Y. 1942). In an action
brought under the Jones Act, summary judgment will be granted for the employer if it appears that the employer has provided compensation under the Longshoremen's Act and the
employee is not a member of the crew or the master of the vessel.
2 Swanson v. Marra Bros., 528 U.S. 1, 7 (1945). Although the Court held several times after
the passage of the Longshoremen's Act that an injured stevedore could recover against his
employer under the Jones Act, citing International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, supra note 18,
these were cases in which the injury occurred prior to the date on which the Longshoremen's
Act became effective. E.g., Urvac v. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234, 238 (1931); Northern Coal &Dock
Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142, 145-46 (1928); Buzynski v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 277 U.S. 226, 228
(1928).
This doctrine was repeated several times. E.g., South Chicago Coal & Dry Dock Co. v.
Basset, supra note 25, at 260; Puget Sound Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U.S. 90, 92 (1937)
(dictum). It was finally reaffirmed in unmistakable terms in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
528 U.S. 85, 100-03 (1946), where a stevedore, employee of an independent contractor, recovered from the shipowner on the warranty of seaworthiness after an injury resulting from a
latent defect in the ship's equipment.
0 Supra note 4, § 935.
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 101 (1946).
Id. at 95.

a' "Most (perhaps all) types of harbor workers are 'seamen' entitled to recover for unseaworthiness." GILMORE &BLACK, ADMIRALTY 252 (1957). See also Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 364
U.S. 406 (1953).
mConsequently, he could not sue under the Jones Act at all because it applies only in actions brought by employees against their employers. See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAlister, 537 U.S. 783 (1949) (dictum); GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 251 (1957).
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the fact that the shipowner is their employer. Also if they can show themselves to be
members of the crew, they can maintain a Jones Act suit, despite the fact that they
have received awards of compensation. 32 The basis for this holding, which nullifies
the employer's exclusive liability under the compensation statute, is that the duties
of the defendant as employer and as shipowner are distinct and he should not be
permitted to avoid the latter. The Longshoremen's Act permits an injured harbor
worker to libel an unseaworthy ship belonging to a third party and the result would
be incongruous if that right were denied when the shipowner is also the employer. 38
This exclusive liability was first negated in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic
S.S. C0.34 There a shipowner sought indemnity from the employer of a injured longshoreman who had recovered against the ship, because the employer stevedoring
company had caused the unseaworthy condition. The defendant maintained that
allowing the shipowner to recover damages in excess of what the employer could
have been compelled to pay as compensation would strip him of the exclusive liability granted by the Longshoremen's Act. Speaking for the majority, Justice Burton
stated that the "exclusive liability" provision did not protect the employer because
the shipowner's claim was not "on account of" 35 the injury but was based on a contractual right to indemnity and thus not within the reach of the statutory provision.36
In reaching its decision, the court in the principal case relied primarily on Reed
v. The Yaka.3 7 In that case the petitioner, an injured stevedore who had received
compensation under the Longshoremen's Act, libeled the ship for unseaworthiness
when his employer was bareboat charterer38 of the vessel and owner pro hac vice.39
There was no third party liability as had existed in Ryan, 40 and the employer was the
party against whom an alternative remedy was being sought. The Supreme Court
declared that the technical difference of ownership of the vessel should not prevent
an injured employee from recovering on the warranty of seaworthiness, although
this conclusion violated the literal meaning of the exclusive remedy clause of the
Longshoremen's Act. 4 1 The majority reasoned that "only blind adherence to the
superficial meaning of a statute" 42 could prompt disregard for the fact that the rea"Biggs v. Norfolk ]Dredging Co., supra note 10.
Id. at 365.

"350 U.S. 124 (1956).
"This is the language of the exclusive liability provision of the Longshoremen's Act, supra
note 4, § 905.
wRyan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Co., supra note 34, at 128-32. Even in the absence
of an express indemnity agreement, the contractor was obliged to reimburse the shipowner
for damages, because of the contractor's breach of its agreement to stow the cargo properly
and safely. Supra at 132-34; Accord, Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315
(1964); GILMORE & BLACK,

ADMIRALTY

367 (1957).

'373 U.S. 410 (1965).
"The vessel was delivered to the charterer, who took complete possession, command, and
control of its navigation.
10Supra note 37, at 412-13. It was determined that the bareboat charterer had assumed the
warranty of seaworthiness and therefore he, and not the owner, must stand responsible for it
when the ship is libeled.
,0Supra note 34.

,1Supra note 4, § 905.
2Reed v. The Yaka, supra note 37, at 415.
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spondent was not only an employer of longshoremen, but also a bareboat charterer
of a vessel for which he must be charged with the traditional and absolute duty of
providing a seaworthy ship. It would be a harsh and incongruous result to permit a
variance in the remedies available to longshoremen, injured under precisely the
same circumstances, because some draw their pay directly from a shipowner and
48
others from a stevedoring company doing the ship's service.
Applying that conclusion to the principal case, the court found no inconsistency
in the claimants seeking compensation on the ground that they are not crew members and suing on the warranty of seaworthiness on the ground that they are seamen. Reed v. The Yaka 44 peremptorily dictates that an employee, injured aboard
his employer's vessel, should be put in the same position as one injured aboard the
vessel of a third party.45 The exclusive remedy clause of the compensation statute
is merely rendered inapposite when the employer is the ship's owner and the em46
ployee is a seaman or one executing a seaman's duties.
But the Biggs decision goes beyond this and holds that the claimants are entitled
to maintain an action under the Jones Act if they can show themselves to be crew
members of a ship.47 This conclusion, based on the principle of avoiding a harsh and
incongruous result, raises a question unanswered by the court. Since the Jones Act
is a remedy available only against the employer of the claimant, 48 where is the harsh
and incongruous result in giving effect to the exclusive remedy clause and denying
the right to a remedy that could not have been used against a third party in any
event? This presents a further question as to the binding power of an administrative
finding. Since the groups covered by the Longshoremen's Act and the Jones Act are
mutually exclusive, 49 did an award of compensation constitute a finding that the injured parties were not members of a crew and thereby excluded from Jones Act
remedies? The court avoids this by relying entirely on Yaka. 50 There are also two
distinctions which the court finds unimportant. The Yaka case was an action brought
only on the warranty of seaworthiness and the Supreme Court did not consider the
Jones Act in its opinion and, secondly, although the petitioner in that case had received compensation, it was not under an award. 5 1
It would seem, therefore, that an issue is raised regarding the binding power of an
administrative finding 52 and, by ignoring that finding, the court has permitted the
claimants to pursue an alternative remedy by contradicting an allegation which is
at the basis of the original awards.
"Ibid.
"Supra note 37.

Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Co., supra note 10, at 365.
Ibid.
'Id. at 364.
'8 See note 31 supra.

,Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra note 28.
50Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Co., supra note 10, at 365.
Id. at 364. Compare Lawrence v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 319 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1963).
See South Chicago Coal &Dry Dock Co. v. Basset, supra note 23, where the Supreme Court
held that the finding of the deputy commissioner that the claimant was not a crew member,
was binding in a subsequent suit by the employer to restrain the award, since it was supported
by the evidence.
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Anti-Trust-Treble Damage Suits-Standing to Sue-South Carolina Council of Milk Producers,Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1966).

IN 1963, THE PIGGLY WIGGLY STORES were selling milk, in South Carolina, at 39 cents
a half gallon, although the prevailing price was then 53 cents a half gallon. Milk was
being supplied to the stores on a discount or rebate basis' by the Paradise Ice Cream
Co., a milk processing plant, that had been purchased by the same concerns2 which
controlled the Piggly Wiggly Stores. On November 12, 1964, the South Carolina
Council of Milk Producers, Inc., an association of raw milk producers, filed an antitrust suit, in the United States District Court, against Piggly Wiggly Wholesale, Inc.,
the Paradise Ice Cream Co. and the other parties involved in this retail grocery store
business. The complaint alleged that defendants had combined and conspired in
restraint of trade and commerce in grocery items, including milk and dairy products
in an effort to monopolize trade and commerce in these commodities contrary to
sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act,8 and that as a proximate result plaintiffs suffered injury in their business. The Council sought injunctive relief and damages of
$500,000 under the appropriate sections of the Clayton Act, 4 the Sherman Act, 5 and
6
the Robinson-Patman Act.
Defendants, hereinafter collectively referred to as Piggly Wiggly, moved for summary judgment. Accordingly, the district court dismissed the suit on the grounds,
inter alia,7 that the Council had failed to state a cause of action upon which relief
could be granted, in that it failed to show or allege any "direct relationship" (i.e.,
either competition or privity of contract) between Piggly Wiggly, processors-distributors of whole milk, and the Council, producers-suppliers of raw milk.8 Absent
1

Originally milk was invoiced to the stores at 48 cents and discounted 10 cents. When the
South Carolina Milk Commission instructed Paradise to sell its milk for not less than 48 cents,
it apparently complied. Nevertheless, Piggly Wiggly continued to sell milk below actual cost,

at 441/2 cents, and received rebates from Paradise for losses incurred
2 The parties concerned were: (a) Commodore Points Terminal Corporation, a Florida
manufacturer of store fixtures, and owner of the Piggly Wiggly Corporation; (b) the Piggly
Wiggly Corporation, franchiser and controller of the trade name, Piggly Wiggly; (c) Piggly
Wiggly Wholesale, Inc., a South Carolina buyer and seller of groceries and a Piggly Wiggly
franchiser; (d) the Greenbax Stamp Co., owned by Piggly Wiggly Wholesale; (e) Joseph T.
Newton, Jr., alleged owner, officer, director and/or stockholder of above corporations; and
(f) individual Piggly Wiggly Stores.
' 26 Stat. 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964). Section 1: "Every contract, combination. . . or
conspiracy, in restrain of trade or commerce among the several States... is declared to be
illegal..." Section 2: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor..."
Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
8
Sherman Act §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964).
8T Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act § 3, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 241 F. Supp. 259 (E.D.S.C.
1965). The district court found that the problem of a non-profit making party plaintiff, the
Council was by charter non-profit making and hence not considered a business under section 4, remediable by appropriate amendments joining individual profit making farmer members in the suit.
8Id. at 262.
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any showing of this direct relationship, the district court reasoned that the Council
had no standing to sue under the judicially limited terms of section 4 of the Clayton
Act. 9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, reversed and remanded the case
for trial, holding that the absence of allegations of directness was not necessarily
fatal to the Council's claim:
.. . if a plaintiff can show himself [as the circuit court felt the Council had]
within the sector of the economy in which the violation threatened a breakdown
of competitive conditions and that he was proximately injured thereby, then
he has the standing to sue.... The sector is sometimes designated as the 'target
area' of the defendant's illegal practices.10
2
The broad wording of section 4 of the Clayton Act" has been judicially limited'
3
because of the extraordinary treble damage remedy which it provides.' The problem
arises when courts have to determine where the line of limitation is to be drawn as
to possible plaintiffs. In the early case of Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.,1 4 the court
held that a shareholder-creditor, employee could not recover for personal losses suffered when the photographic supply house for which he worked was allegedly driven
into bankruptcy by the illegal practices of a competitor. The reasoning of the court
was that "the injury complained of was directed at the corporation and not the individual stockholder... [thus] any injury which he, as a stockholder, received was
indirect, remote and consequential."'S Loeb produced the judicial basis for excluding
claims for personal losses suffered by creditors,1 shareholders,' 7 officers,' 8 and employees' 9 of injured corporations from court consideration. In a somewhat similar

OSupra note 4. The section reads: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws may sue therefor ... and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained..."
1
"South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 418 (4th Cir.
1966); see, Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 919 (1951); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp. 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
n Supra note 4.

2See, Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958); Gerli v. Silk
Ass'n of America, 36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844 (5th Cir.
1957); Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Radio Kieth Orpheum Corp., 193 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956);
Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), af'd.
113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940); Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Corey v. Boston Ice Co., 207 Fed. 465 (D.
Mass. 1913); Productive Inventions v. Trico Products Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1955).
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., supra note 10, at 55.
1, 183 Fed. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
5
'- Id. at 709.
"s See, e.g., Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, supra note 12.
1
7 See sura note 12.
18Sargent v. National Broadcasting Co., 136 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Gerli v. Silk
Ass'n of America, supra note 12; Corey v. Boston Ice Co., supra note 12.
Is Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, supra note 12; Corey v. Boston Ice Co., supra note 12;
Centanni v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La. 1963); Walder v. Paramount
Publix Corp., 132 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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situation, recovery has been denied to the landlord of a defendant's competitor, 20
the rental being partially based on a percentage of the lessee's receipts. 2 ' It has also
been held that a patent licensor, not receiving expected royalties from his licensee
due to the anti-trust violations of the defendant, could not recover. 22 The basic principle delineated by these cases is that derivative causes of action may not be maintained under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Nevertheless, this line of judicial reasoning is not to be construed as a general bar to claims for damages by stockholders, employees or creditors. of an injured corporation, because the anti-trust violations
"may result in injuries to a stockholder [and conceivably an employee or creditor]
which are not the injuries of the corporation and for which he may sue in his own
right." 23
Two schools of thought arose from the initial Loeb doctrine which excluded derivative section 4 claims. In each case considered, the important question of whether
the injury to plaintiff was direct, or whether it was derived from the injury received
directly by another, had to be asked, and the answer determined if a claimant's suit
would survive the Loeb directness test or not.
One school of judicial thought has reasoned that 'directness' depends upon the
existence of either a direct competitive relationship, or privity of contract between
the plaintiff and the defendant. 24 Narrowing the scope to one similar to that found
in Newton in which a supplier is suing a competitor of the supplier's customer for
injuries arising from an alleged anti-trust violation, the Massachusetts' District Court,
in Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc.,2 5 held:
The Clayton Act does not give a private cause of action to a corporation which
is not in competition with defendant but whose losses result only from an interruption or diminution of profitable relationship with a second corporation
directly affected by alleged violations of anti-trust laws, and this is so even though
there is to a substantial extent common ownership of stock of the two corporations, and even though the first corporation sells virtually all of its product to
26
the second corporation.
Snow Crest is apparently contrary to Newton. Snow Crest's supplier provided 90
percent of the ingredients used by Snow Crest in making syrup. 27 In Newton, the
Council supplied its processor with raw milk. In both cases, the suppliers complained
of injuries resulting from the business practices of the competitors of the respective
concerns which were supplied by the plaintiffs involved. And yet, the court in Snow
21Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890
(1956).
2 But see, Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957).
Productive Inventions v. Trico Prod. Corp., supra note 12.
1 36 A.L.R. 2d 1335; see United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 F. 574 (2d
Cir. 1916); Peter v. Western Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1953); Fanchon & Marco,
Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
"' See, e.g., Snow Crest Beverages v. Recipe Foods, Inc., and Volasco Prod. Co. v. Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co., supra note 12.
2 Supra note 12.
2Id. at 909.
21 Snow Crest Beverages Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., supra note 12.
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Crest would not entertain the supplier's suit, while in Newton, the supplier's suit
was allowed. The reason for the difference is the narrowing of focus in Snow Crest
to exclude for lack of privity or competitive relationship between the adverse parties the same type of suit that was allowed in Newton.
In Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.,28 the circuit court found
that "it is well established in the law that a supplier is too remote and too far removed from the direct injury to recover damages resulting from violations of antitrust laws directed at the supplier's customers." 29 Volasco and Snow Crest are discussed by the court in Newton. An attempt is made to distinguish them from the
instant case on the grounds that the product involved was an ingredient of the final
product, while the raw milk which the Council supplied is "essentially the equivalent commodity," 3 0 to the final processed milk.
More importantly, the court in Newton denies the privity-competition basis of
the 'directness' line of reasonings and implicitly supports a broader second school of
thought:
.. . if either of the cited cases [Snow Crest and Volasco] be read as declaring
that a supplier who is not in privity or competition with one guilty of anti-trust
misconduct, but whose business is proximately affected by such misconduct, can
never have a claim for anti-trust damages against the wrongdoer, we could not
follow the decision that far.3 1
The second school of judicial reasoning is typified by the decisions in Conference
of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc.,32 and Karseal Corporation v. Richfield Oil Corporation.33 These and other cases3 4 espouse the idea that it is not necessary for plaintiff to establish either a competitive or privity relationship between himself and the
alleged violator, but that he must show that an alleged anti-trust violation ". . . has
been committed which harms him ... [and] that he is within the area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular
industry."3 5 The broader concept of an 'area of the economy' or 'target area' of the
defendant's illegal practices36 allows for suits which would be excluded by the appliSupra note 12.
2 Id. at 395.
8*South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, supra note 10, at 418.
m
Ibid.
92Supra note 12.
8Supra note 12.
"See, Brownlee v. Malco Theatres, 99 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Ark. 1951); Clark Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Myers
v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1943); Vines v. General Outdoor
Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1948); see also, State of Missouri v. Stupp Brothers
Bridge and Iron Co., 248 F. Supp. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1965); State of Washington v. General Elec.
Co., 246 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
n Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., supranote 10, at 54-55.
U6A well developed statement of the concept is found in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, at 220 (9th Cir. 1964): ". . it [the target area] was intended to
express the view that the plaintiff must show that, whether or not then known to the conspirators, plaintiff's affected operation was actually in the area which it could reasonably be
foreseen would be affected by the conspiracy."
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cation of a competitive or privity standard. Thus it was held, in Newton, that
"even without allegations of directness of injury the present complaint made out a
' 7
cause of action under the anti-trust statutes."
Is it the more satisfactory solution for courts, in seeking to eliminate derivative
anti-trust suits for treble damages, to dismiss summarily suits by those who are not
competitors or in privity with the wrongdoers, or to allow plaintiffs the opportunity
to present evidence at trial in an attempt to show that they were proximately and
not remotely or consequentially injured by defendants' misconduct? The better of
the two approaches appears to be the latter, especially in light of the Supreme
Court's recognition of the policy embodied in congressional legislation giving recourse to private enforcement of the anti-trust laws, under section 4 of the Clayton
Act. Since Congress has determined that certain anti-trust activities are injurious to
the public, the Court, "in the face of such a policy... should not add requirements to
burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress in those
laws." 88
While "directness" of injury might well be assumed, when a competitive or privity
relationship exists, non-existence of such relationships does not, semantically or
otherwise, preclude a direct injury. It has been well said that to satisfy the judicially
fabricated "directness" test, a plaintiff "must show that his loss was not a consequence
of injury to someone else, i.e., that he had direct relations with the wrongdoer, or,
(emphasis added] that he was within the 'target area' of the violation." 9 Thereby,
even though failing to allege direct relations with the wrongdoer, as the Council
had, in Newton, a plaintiff might still be afforded the opportunity to evidence his
allegation that his business was proximately injured by the violation.
37 South

Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, supra note 10, at 418.
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
8164 COLUM. L. REv,570, 581 (1964).

Insurance Contracts-Wrongful Cancellation by Insurer-Measure of Recovery in Restitution-Bollenback v. ContinentalCas. Co., 82 Ore. 749, 414
P.2d 802 (1966).

CLARENCE X. BOLLENBACK FILED A CLAIM

with the Continental Casualty Company

under a health and accident insurance policy on which he had paid premiums regularly. After the company refused to pay the claim on the grounds that the policy
had lapsed in 1959 due to non-payment of premiums, Bollenback brought an action
for restitution to recover all premiums paid. A judge, sitting without a jury, found
that defendant repudiated the contract by non-payment of plaintiff's claim and ruled
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that plaintiff recover the amount of all premiums paid.' On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Oregon remanded the case to the trial court with directions to modify the
judgment declaring that plaintiff received the actual value of "protection" under
the policy prior to 1959 so that he could recover only those premiums paid by him
after that date.2
An irreconcilable conflict between two principal lines of authority exists concerning the measure of damages for the wrongful cancellation, repudiation or termination of an insurance contract by the insurer where the assured elects8 to put an
end to the contract. 4 One rule is to the effect that if the insured elects 5 to rescind the
contract rather than have it enforced he may recover the amount of premiums paid
or premiums with interest. 7 The other rule, where the assured is still capable of
securing other insurance of like nature and kind, permits recovery of the difference
between the cost of carrying the cancelled insurance and the cost of the new insurance for a like term.8 As a variation of the latter rule it has been held that where the
assured is no longer insurable, his measure of damages is the present value of his
policy.9
Recovery under each rule is, in fact, based on a different theory.10 The purpose of
rescission and restitution is to place both parties as near as possible to their positions
prior to the formation of the contract. The purpose of a suit for damages is to place
the injured party as near as possible to the position he would be in had the contract
been completed." Some courts have confused a suit for restitution upon rescission
with a suit for damages.' 2 Generally, all premiums are awarded as the measure of
recovery where suit is based on the theory of rescission and restitution, but in Ken-

1 Bollenback
2

v. Continental Cas. Co., 82 Ore. 749, 751, 414 P.2d 802, 804 (1966).
Id. at 765, 414 P.2d at 812.

8 Annot., 48 A.L.R. 107 (1927).
...the rule as reported by the weight of authority is that where an insurer wrongfully

cancels, repudiates, or terminates the contract of insurance, the insured may, at once,
pursue either of three courses: (1) He may elect to consider the policy at an end and
recover the just value of the policy, or such measure of damages as a court in the particular jurisdiction approves; (2) he may institute proceedings to have the policy adjudged
to be in force; or (3) he may tender the premiums, and, if acceptance is refused, wait
until the policy by its terms becomes payable and test the forfeiture in a proper action
on the policy.
'Id. at 110.
Ibid.
'See, e.g., McKee v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 383, 75 Am. Dec. 129 (1859); Lovick v. Providence Life Ass'n., 110 N.C. 93, 14 S.E. 506 (1892); Fort v. Iowa Legion of Honor, 146 Iowa 185,
123 N.W. 224 (1909).
7See, e.g., Van Werden v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y., 99 Iowa 621, 68 N.W. 892 (1896);
Strauss v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n., 126 N.C. 971, 36 S.E. 352 (1900); Gaskill v. Pittsburgh
Life & Trust Co., 261 Pa. 546, 104 Atl. 775 (1918).
8
See, e.g., Keyser v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n., 60 App. Div. 297, 70 N.Y. Supp. 32
(1901); Bass v. Life & Annuity Ass'n., 96 Kan. 205, 150 Pac. 588 (1915).

0Garland v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 179 N.C. 67, 101 S.E. 616 (1919).
10
Bollenback v. Continental Cas. Co., supra note 1, at 762, 414 P.2d at 809.
115 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 996, at 15 (1964).
12Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 196 Tenn. 641, 270 S.W.2d 188 (1954);
Hinkson v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 93 Ore. 473, 183 Pac. 24 (1919). The Hinkson case was
overruled by Bollenback v. Continental Casualty Co., supra note 1.
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tucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers13 plaintiff was awarded all premiums in a
suit for "damages." In another case tried on the theory of damages the measure of
4
recovery was all premiums less the value of the coverage received.1 Where the insured was not able to obtain new insurance it was held that the measure of recovery
was the amount of premiums paid plus interest rather than the value of the policy.15
However, it has been held that where the insured prays for recovery of premiums,
it is immaterial whether he is no longer insurable. 16 This confusion contributes to the
fact that the courts are badly divided on the correct measure of damages where the
injured party, in fact, elects to rescind his contract and bring an action for restitution.lr
The majority view in the United States where restitution is sought after rescission
of a wrongfully cancelled insurance contract, is probably that all premiums may be recovered.' 8 There are cases which so hold without discussing the deduction of "protection" benefits. 19 Other cases reach this conclusion after rejecting the contention
that such deduction should be made. 20 It has been stated that all premiums may be
recovered where wrongful cancellation involves a combination life and accident
and health policy. 21 However, another line of cases holds that the benefit of "protection" received should be deducted from the total amount of premiums paid to
arrive at the correct amount recoverable. 2 2 Where there was a wrongful cancellation
of the accident and. health provision of a combination life and accident and health
policy, all premiums were not recoverable on the ground that the life provision re23
mained unimpaired.
In Bollenback, the court relied heavily on Watson v. Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co.24 where the insured's assignee brought an action for restitution of all premiums after rescinding a wrongfully cancelled life insurance policy. There it was said
that the benefits, if any, received by the insured must be deducted in an executory
contract. 25 "The purpose of the contract, in so far as plaintiff was concerned, was to

18Id.
"1Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. v. Weck, 9 Ill. App. 358 (1881).
5Grand United Order of Odd Fellows v. Massey, 87 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935);
Washington Life Ins, Co. v. Lovejoy, 149 S.W. 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
16Bankers' Health & Life Ins. Co. v. James, 177 Ga. App. 520, 170 S.E. 357 (1933).
17Mather, Measure of Damages for Wrongful Repudiation of Executory Life Insurance
Contracts in Texas, 12 TEXAS L. Rv.251, 254 (1934):
The repeated failure of the courts to recognize a distinction between an action for rescission entitling plaintiff to a return of the premiums with interest, and an action for dam-

ages merely, it is believed, will account for much of the confusion with respect to the
measure of damages.
18Annot., supra note 3, at 11.
10See, e.g., Street v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n., 126 N.C. 971, 36 S.E. 1024 (1900);
Glover v. Bankers' Health & Life Ins. Co., 30 Ga. App. 308, 117 S.E. 665 (1923).
" See, e.g., Union Centr. Life Ins. Co. v. Pottiker, 33 Ohio St. 459, 31 Am. Rep. 555 (1878);
Grand Lodge Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Martin, 218 S.W. 40 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
1 Supra note 16.
2 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n. v. Ferrenbach, 144 Fed. 342 (8th Cir. 1906); Capital City
Benefit Soc'y v. Travers, 4 F.2d 290 (D.C. Cir. 1925).
King v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 114 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tenn. 1954).
,140 F;2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 746 (1943).
Id.at 677.
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obtain protection in the form of defendant's promise to pay claims in case of his
disability."26 Thus, plaintiff received the benefit of the "protection" he had bargained for prior to the time of cancellation. "Because insurance protection cannot be
returned to defendant, the theory of recovery [restitution] necessarily means the
return to plaintiff of all premiums less the value of any benefits plaintiff has actually
received under the contract." 27 Since plaintiff did not claim that the amount of premiums paid was in excess of the cost of carrying the risk of his policy, the defendant
was permitted to retain all premiums paid prior to the date of cancellation of the
28
policy.
The number of recent cases on the measure of recovery for wrongful cancellation
of an insurance policy is slight. In Sabbagh v. Proifessional & Business Men's Life
Ins. Co.29 where plaintiff brought an action for restitution to recover the first premium paid on four life insurance policies alleging fraud in the inducement, the
court allowed deduction for cost of carrying the insurance. Deduction for "protection" was also permitted in Schwer v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees,30 but in that
case an accident and health policy was viewed as a monthly term policy which had
to be renewed each month. The Schwer court said in dictum, however, that on a
continuous policy, plaintiff could recover all premiums paid plus interest. 8 ' Recovery of all premiums was permitted in Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Rogers.82 Thus, it cannot be said that the few recent cases show a trend in favor
of the Bollenback decision.
The early case of American Life Ins. Co. v,McAdenss rejected the deduction for
insurance "protection" argument stating that ". .. although the company carried the
4
risk.., the company has paid nothing and the plaintiffs have received nothing."3
The reasoning of McAden has been relied on by subsequent cases which reach a similar result.85 In another case it was said that "the rights of the parties under the contract had attached, but the plaintiff had never received any actual benefit from it."36
It seems clear that in these cases the theory of placing both parties in statu quo is
accomplished by simply restoring the parties to their respective financial positions
at the time the contract was formed.
The rejection of insurance "protection" as an actual benefit has been severely criticized as an assumption resting on "a misconception of the theory and business of
life insurance." 87 In the case of Lovell v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co.aS the Supreme

2 Supra note 1, at 754, 414 P.2d at 806.
T
2 8Id. at 765, 414 P.2d at 812.
Ibid.
-79 S.D. 615, 116 N.W.2d 513 (1962).
so 153 Ohio St. 312, 91 N.E.2d 523 (1950).
8m ld. at 323, 91 N.E.2d at 529.
USupra note 12.
109 Pa. 399, 1 At. 256 (1885).
'Id. at 405, 1 Ad. at 258.
See, e.g., Gaskill v. Pittsburgh Life & Trust Co., supra note 7.
Black v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor, 120 Fed. 580 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd,
123 Fed. 650 (3d Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 191 U.S. 568 (1903).
2Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n. v. Ferrenbach, supra note 22, at 345.
U111 U.S. 264 (1884).
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Court of the United States considered "protection" as an actual benefit and did not
permit recovery of premiums paid prior to wrongful cancellation. This case is relied on by Watson and other cases which reach the same result.3 9 The Lovell case,
40
however, was distinguished in Black v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor.
Lovell involved a mutual mistake by the insured and the insurer's agent with respect
to the surrender of a life insurance policy. 4 1 This line of cases would permit recovery
of all premiums on a "total failure of consideration" 42 or where no risk has attach43
ed.
The Watson court said that an insurance contract is not a fixed obligation to pay
money at a future date. 44 Yet it has been stated that the sole obligation of an insurer
is to pay money at the death of the policy holder under a life insurance contract.4 5
Thus, the consideration bargained for by the insured would appear to be a significant factor in determining the measure of recovery. Here again the courts are confusing an action for restitution upon recission with an action for damages. It has
been pointed out that an action for restitution is not based on the contract.4 6 The
contract has been rescinded.
Professor Corbin has stated: "Because of the aleatory character of such [insurance] contracts, it is certain that there is no agreed equivalency between the sum
promised by the insurer and the premiums to be paid by the insured." 47 Both Corbin 48 and Williston 49 seem to prefer that line of cases which deduct "protection" benefits received by the insured.
Although Bollenback notes the failure of the courts to distinguish between an
action for restitution upon rescission and one for damages, it is believed that the
court in that case also failed to distinguish the two forms of action. It seems correct
to say that the insured has bargained for "protection" and therefore, has received
a benefit: that which he bargained for. However while an action for damages is
based on the contract, an action for restitution is not. The equitable result requires
recovery of all premiums as the insurer, even though carrying a risk, has actually
paid nothing, while the insured has paid premiums and actually gained nothing.
The insurer should not be permitted to benefit by his own wrongful cancellation of
the contract.

Capital City Benefit Soc'y v. Travers, supra note 22.
10Supra note 36.
11Lovell v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 38, at 265.
1 Watson v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 24, at 677.
U Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCormick, 19 Ind. App. 49, 49 N.E. 44 (1898).
"Watson v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 24, at 677.
" Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Barber, 168 Tenn. 347, 349, 79 S.W.2d 36, 37 (1935).
"National Life Co. v. Harvey, 159 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
'15 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1118, at 635 (1964).
"Id. at § 1118.
9 5 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs § 1460 A, at 4085 (1937):
...
an assured has been in many cases permitted, though, it seems unjustly, to recover on
repudiation of a life insurance policy the full amount of the premiums paid, in spite of
the period of protection that the insured has enjoyed.
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Seaworthiness-Stevedores--Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360 F.2d 539

(2d Cir. 1966).

PLAINTIFF, EMPLOYED AS A STEVEDORE for International Terminal Operating Co.,
was in the process of unloading the S.S. Madaket, owned by the defendant Waterman
Steamship Corporation. To facilitate unloading operations Terminal received permission from Waterman to temporarily remove a one ton steel ladder attached to the
superstructure of the ship. The stevedores hastily agreed on a plan by which it would
be lowered through a hatch of the Madaket and laid on the floor of the hold. In attaching this ladder to a hoist plaintiff's co-workers placed proper equipment aside,
and used a "S"hook unsuitable for the use to which it was put. When the bottom
of the ladder reached the floor of the hold it became disengaged from the hook and
in falling injured the plaintiff, Skibinski. He brought this suit against Waterman
alleging that the S.S. Madaket was unseaworthy, Waterman in turn brings in codefendant Terminal. The District Court for the Southern District of New York
gave judgment for the plaintiff,' and the Second Circuit affirmed stating that improper use of this equipment by the stevedores gave rise to a condition of unsea2
worthiness on the S.S. Madaket.
The doctrine of the warranty of seaworthiness was until recently limited only to
seamen.3 Courts have looked with favor upon suits by seamen because of the loneliness, perils and hardships endured while at sea. 4 In 1926 the Supreme Court decided that longshoremen were "seamen"5 for purposes of recovery under the Jones
Act. 6 This remedy for negligence was short lived however, when in 1927 the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 7 was passed by Congress. This
Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in 19328 and for nineteen years it was the
longshoreman's exclusive remedy. During these years the Supreme Court decided
that in relation to seamen, the shipowners duty to furnish a seaworthy ship was absolute, thus making clear that his liability was independent of negligence. 9
Recently the trend of the courts toward longshoremen was reversed in Sea Shipping Co. v. Sieracki'0 in which remedies afforded by the Longshoreman Act were
exclusive only against the employer, leaving the injured stevedore free to bring
suit against the owner whether or not he was negligent, for reasons of unseaworthi-

1

Skibinski v. Waterman S.$. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
2 Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1966).
8 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sierachi, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
4See Note, Extension of the Unseaworthiness Remedy to Longshoremen-Triumph of
Doctrine Over Statute, 15 W. REs. L. REV. 753 (1964). See also dissent of Chief Justice Stone
in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sierachi, supra note 3.
5 International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
8Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
744 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
8Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
0 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). The reason for this is that seamen were
subject
to the rigorous discipline of the sea.
10
Supra note 3.
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ness of the vessel."1 Today it is generally accepted that a shipowner is liable for a
condition of unseaworthiness even if this condition was brought about by the negli12
gence of the stevedoring employees.
3
A shipowner is not an insurer.' His duty is not to provide an accident-free ship,
4
but only to provide a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use.1
Thus, the difficulty arises in determining whether or not a condition of unseaworthiness existed, which in turn gave rise to the injury.
The Skibinski court relied on Grillea v. United States15 as authority to support
its finding that a condition of unseaworthiness had been created. Here a stevedore
had placed the wrong hatch over the hold of a ship and on the following day another stevedore fell through this hatch and was injured. Judge Learned Hand held that
the act of negligence had stopped and when it did a condition of unseaworthiness
was created. In deciding this case Judge Hand stressed the time element, inferring
that if seaworthy equipment is made unseaworthy at the moment of injury no liability should rest on the shipowner. Skibinski puts to use part of Judge Hand's reasoning in Grillea, by inferring that the negligent act of the stevedores had stopped, and
the "S"hook became part of the Madaket's equipment. 16
Judge Hand's reasoning in Grillea, in respect to the time element, was doubted
when the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.17 held the shipowner
liable even if the condition was merely temporary. The majority uses this case in
support of its argument that the Madaket was temporarily unseaworthy.
In Mitchell, however, the moment in time in which a ship becomes even temporarily unseaworthy was not decided. Justice Stewart stated:
What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated to furnish an
accident-free ship. The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a vessel
and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The standard is not
perfection, but reasonable fitness.' 8
Morales v. City of Galveston19 affirmed by the Supreme Court after Mitchell inferred
that the duration of the defect should be considered as one of the elements in deter"' For criticism of the interpretation of the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation Act see Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. 1tMv. 1187 (1963).
See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 829 (1961).
1BSee Note, Admiralty, Ship Owner Not Insurer of Seamen's Safety, 37 TuL. L. REv. 106
(1962).
Boudoin v.Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 836 (1955).
282 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
18 Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., supra note 2, at 542. "[T]he use of this apparatus took
a substantial amount of time, so that the apparatus became part of the Mandaket's equipment."
See Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., supra note 1, at 298-4 where it was stated that in less
than ten minutes from the time that the stevedores received orders to lower the ladder the
accident occurred. Thus it can be concluded from the district court's review of the facts that
the "S"hook was in use for no more than ten minutes. Is this a substantialamount of time,
as Judge Hays concludes?
862 U.S. 589 (1960).
sId. at 550.
370 U.S. 165 (1962).
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mining whether or not the ship is unseaworthy, thus leaving the question as to what
time the ship becomes unseaworthy open for the lower federal courts to interpret.
The answer to this question alone does not determine seaworthiness, but it is an
important factor to be considered.
If mere negligence by a fellow stevedore was the sole cause of the injury the shipowner is not held liable, 20 however, if there is an unsafe condition of the workplace,
which may have been caused solely by the negligence of the co-worker the warranty
2
of seaworthiness will have been held to be breached. 1 Recent decisions under circumstances very similar to these of Skibinski have been rendered in favor of the
22
shipowner. For example, in Billeci v. United States where plaintiff's co-workers
omitted placing a safety device in a winch, which subsequently broke injuring the
plaintiff. The court distinguished the Grillea decision by pointing out that there the
2
negligent act had terminated and created a condition. a
24
The Court draws support from Reid v. Quebec PaperSales & Transp. Co., and
25
Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic. In Reid the condition lasted only a few
seconds while a portable ladder was negligently left unattended. In Strika longshoremen used two securing devices instead of one in hoisting a pontoon. As in Skibinski
the equipment was proper, but was improperly used. In both Reid and Strika the
negligence of the stevedores had terminated resulting in an unseaworthy condition.
Unseaworthiness has been denied under similar facts. In Spinelli v. Isthmian S.S.
Co., 26 a hoist broke injuring the plaintiff. The court absolved the shipowner saying
27
that there was no defective equipment. In Puddu v. Royal Neth. S.S. Co., the beam
buckled on the ship, also due to the negligence of the plaintiff's fellow longshoremen. Judge Hays' opinion (concurring in the result) states, citing the reasoning in
Grillea:
In the present case the defect arose 'as a momentary step or phase in the progress
incident in a continuous
of work on board' and "should be considered as an
28
course of operation" and not an unfitness of the ship.
Judge Hays distinguishes these cases when he says that they "were thought to involve
29
transitory situations which had not yet ripened into unseaworthiness." He makes
Massa v. C.A. Venezuelan Navigacion, 332 F.2d 779 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914
(1964); Spinelli v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 326 F.2d 870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964);
Neal v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 306 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1962); Rawson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 304
F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); Puddu v. Royal Neth. S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 840 (1962); Pinto v. States Marine Corp., 296 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961).
s' Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Trans. Co., 340 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1965); Grillea v. United
States, supra note 15; Mahnick v. Southern S.S. Co., supra note 9; Strika v. Neth. Ministry of
Traffic, 185 F.2d 55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
22 298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962).
Id. at 706. There was no discussion of when the negligent act would become a condition.
0 Supra note 21.
Supra note 21.
10Supra note 20.
227Supra note 20.
1d. at 757.
29 Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., supra note 2, at 542.
'o
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no attempt to define when in point of time a "transitory situation" ripens into unseaworthiness. Whether it ripens or not may be dependent on whether a ladder, such
as in Skibinski, is in one instance lowered negligently by a stevedore causing injury to
his co-worker, or whether ten minutes before lowering the ladder an "S" hook is negligently inserted by a stevedore as the connecting device between the ladder and
the hoist. 30 Only in the latter case will the shipowner be liable since in the former
case the negligent act had not yet terminated and in the latter instance it had. If
this is the main distinction in instances such as these, then it is difficult to see why
the Billeci decision was rendered for the shipowner and in Skibinski the exact opposite conclusion was reached. The court could have rendered a decision for the shipowner in Skibinski by saying that the condition did not exist, implying that
the negligence of the stevedores in the process of lowering the ladder by means of
an "S"hook had not terminated. It might have been just as possible for the Billeci
court to render judgment for the plaintiff, finding that the negligent act of the stevedores in omitting to place the necessary safety device in the winch created a condition of unseaworthiness.
The distinction underlying the reasoning in Skibinski, which is based upon whether the negligent act of the stevedores had terminated or not, is uncertain. In the
future, under similar circumstances such as in Skibinski and Billeci, who can foresee
whether the court will discover a condition of unseaworthiness or merely negligence?
In the dissent Judge Friendly points out, very aptly:
It is time to scuttle a doctrine which requires judges to make distasteful hairsplitting distinctions unrelated to any intelligible concepts of right and wrong;
granted that liability for unseaworthiness does not rest on fault, it ought to rest
3
on something more casuistry. '
The Supreme Court should deal with the problem of a momentarily unsafe condition
created solely by the negligence of the stevedores, to avoid these "hairsplitting de32
cisions".
01Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., supra note 2.
U Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., supra note 2, at 544.
' Ibid.

Suretyship-Priority of Claims-FirstNational Bank of St. Paul v. McHasco
Electric Co., - Minn. -, 141 N.W. 2d. 491 (1966).

MCHAsco ELECTRIC, INC. (CONTRACTOR) entered into three construction contracts
with three municipalities in Minnesota. Each contract required that all creditors'
claims be paid as a condition to receiving final payment and provided for the mu-
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nicipalities to retain a proportion of the funds for use in paying labor and material
claims, should the contractor default. Appellant, Fidelity and Casualty Company of
New York (surety) furnished the performance bonds required by Minnesota statute.,
Subsequently the contractor made an assignment, effective in the event of default, to
the surety of all contract proceeds. During performance, McHasco obtained two
loans from respondent, First National Bank of St. Paul, and in consideration thereof
made an assignment to the bank of all accounts receivable on the contracts. Of these
loans, 85 per cent were used in payment of labor and material claims. Upon completion of the work, the contractor defaulted in payment of the labor and materialmen,
and the surety, under compulsion of the bonds, satisfied the outstanding claims.
Consequently both the surety and the bank sought the retained funds in the hands
of the municipalities. The trial court ruled in favor of the bank. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed, holding that the claim of the surety to with2
held funds was superior to that of the bank.
The priority of claims to a fund withheld by an owner as between a surety and an
assignee bank has been an issue of repeated litigation. The majority of courts agree
that the surety's claim is founded upon the equitable doctrine of subrogation.8 The
question then becomes: to whose rights is the surety subrogated? It has been held that
the surety gains the rights of the contractor. 4 This leaves the surety with nothing; for
by the act of assignment the contractor has divested itself of all rights to the fund,
and consequently there remain no rights to which the surety may succeed through
subrogation.
Many courts have ruled that the surety, having performed the contractor's obligations to the labor and materialmen, should be subrogated to the rights which these
creditors had possessed 5-their rights as creditors of the contractor and their rights
to the fund in the owner's hands. This right has generally been recognized where the
surety has acted under compulsion of the bond and not as a volunteer,6 or where it
1

MINN. STAT. ANN.,

§ 574.26 (1945) provides:

No contract with the state, or with any municipal corporation... for the doing of any
public work, shall be valid for any purpose, unless the contractor shall give bond to the
state or other body contracted with, for the use of the obligee and all persons doing work
or furnishing skill, tools, machinery, or materials ... conditioned for the payment, as
they become due, of all just claims for such work, tools, machinery, skill, materials ... for
the completion of the contract in accordance with its terms, for saving the obligee harmless from all costs and charges that may accrue on account of the doing of the work
specified ....
'Minn. -, 141 N.W.2d 491 (1966).
8 83 C.J.S. Subrogation § 1 (1953):
Subrogation is the substitution of another person in the place of a creditor, so that the
person in whose favor it is exercised succeeds to the rights of the creditor in relation to
the debt ....
' Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Union State Bank, 21 F.2d 102 (D. Minn. 1927); Hipwill v. National Sur. Co., 130 Iowa 656, 105 N.W. 318 (1905); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. City of Auburn,
150 Wash. 114, 272 Pac. 34 (1928).
5 Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962); Hadden v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl.
529, 132 F. Supp. 202 (1955); Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 736, 93 F. Supp. 891
(1950); National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 724, 133 F. Supp. 381, cert denied sub
nom. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 350 U.S. 902 (1955); Logan Planning Mill Co. v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 212 F. Supp. 906 (D.C. W.Va. 1962).
1 Central State Bank v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 9 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1925); Exchange State

1966]

Case Notes

has taken an assignment upon payment of the claims.7 It has been held, however,
that upon payment of the labor and material claims, the "lien" was satisfied and
there remained no rights for the surety to acquire. 8 Likewise, where the labor and
materialmen had no right to the fund,9 or there was no special fund for their protection,' 0 the surety's claim was useless. The surety, by performing under its bond, has
not only performed the contractor's duty to its creditors, but has also performed the
contractor's duty to the owner. Thus, many courts have ruled that, upon payment,
the surety is subrogated to the rights of the owner." This gives the surety a preference; for the contractor or its assignee cannot compel payment of this fund without
rendering performance. However, in some cases, the surety has lost this preference
where it was found to be a volunteer,12 or where the assignee bank made payments
to the labor and materialmen either directly, 13 or indirectly by agreement with the
contractor.14 On the other hand, in many cases the tracing of the loans into the hands
of the creditors was held to be immaterial.' 5
The "Minnesota rule," 16 following the leading United States Supreme Court cases
of Prairie State Bank v. United States17 and Henningsen v. United States Fidelity &

Bank v. Federal Sur. Co., 28 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1928); Southern Sur. Co. v. Merchants' & Farmers' Bank, 203 Ind. 173, 176 N.E. 846 (1931).
Riverview State ]Bank v. Wentz, 34 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1929); Federal & Deposit Co. v.
Claiborne Parish School Bd., 11 F.2d 404 (W.D. La. 1926), aff'd., 40 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1930);
Aetna Trust Co. v. Nackenhorst, 188 Ind.621, 122 N.E. 421 (1919).
Merner Lumber Co. v. Brown, 218 Cal. 136, 21 P.2d 590 (1933).
United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947); Adamson v. Paonessa, 180 Cal.
157, 179 Pac. 880 (1919); Aetna Trust Co. v. Nackenhorst, supra note 7; Sundheim v. School
District, 311 Pa. 90, 166 At. 365 (1933).
0Adamson v. Paonessa, supra note 9; First National Bank v. Monroe County, 131 Miss. 828,
95 So. 726 (1923); Guthrie Investments, Inc. v. Bennett, 63 Wash.2d 697, 388 P.2d 955 (1964).
n Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896); Henningsen v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Board of Water Commissioners, 66 F.2d
730 (2d Cir. 1933); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Langston, 180 Ark. 643, 22 S.W.2d 381
(1929); Barrett Bros. v. County of St. Louis, 165 Minn. 158, 206 N.W. 49 (1925); Canton Exch.
Bank v. Yazoo County, 144 Miss. 579, 109 So. 1 (1926); First Nat'l Bank v. Pesha, 99 Neb. 785,
157 N.W. 924 (1916); Wasco County v. New England Equitable Ins. Co., 88 Ore. 465, 172 Pac.
126 (1918); Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 264 N.Y. 159, 190
N.E. 330 (1934).
1 Southern Sur. Co. v. Fort Smith Dist., 17 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1926); Weber Implement &
Auto.Co. v. Dubach, 132 Kan. 309, 295 Pac. 979 (1931); Electric Transmission Co. v. Pennington Gap Bank, 137 Va. 94, 119 S.E. 99 (1923).
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. City, 93 Kan. 539, 144 Pac. 852 (1914).
1,New Amsterdam Cas. Co, v. Wurtz, 145 Minn. 438, 177 N.W. 664 (1920); Ganley v. Pipe-

stone, 154 Minn. 193, 191 N.W. 738 (1923); Standard Oil Co. v. Remer, 167 Minn. 352, 209
N.W. 315 (1926); Puget Sound State Bank v. Galucci, 82 Wash. 445, 144 Pac. 698 (1914).
1 Farmers Bank v. Hayes, 58 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1932); Md. Cas. Co. v. Bd.of Water Comm'rs,

supra note 11; Union Indem. Co. v. City of New Smyrna, 100 Fla. 980, 130 So. 453 (1930);
First Nat'l Bank v. Pesha, supra note 11; State v Schlesinger, 114 Ohio St. 323, 151 N.E. 177

(1926).
10 National Sur. Co. v. Berggren, 126 Minn. 188, 148 N.W. 55 (1914); New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. Wurtz, supra note 14; Ganley v. City of Pipestone, supra note 14; Standard Oil Co. v.
Remer, supra note 14; Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Federal Const. Co., 168 Minn. 202,
209 N.W. 911 (1926); reviewed in,Seaboard Sur. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 121 F.2d

288 (8th Cir. 1941).
"

Supra note 11.
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Guaranty Company, 1 8 has been that the equity of the surety, through subrogation,
is superior to that of one loaning money to the contractor. This holds even though
the advanced money goes into performance of the contract, unless the money is loaned under a contract obligating the lender to make advances. 1 9 The respondent bank
in McHasco argued that the Minnesota rule was changed by the subsequent case,
FarmersState Bank v. Burns, 20 so as not to require an obligation on the part of the
assignee bank to advance funds to the contractor. In that case the contractor had
contracts with the cities of Madelia and Owatonna. The surety, which suffered a loss
only on the Madelia contract, claimed funds withheld by Owatonna. The court, in
holding for the bank, took notice that there was no provision in either contract
which required payment of all claims as a condition of final payment. The court
found that the execution of the performance bond was merely compliance with an
"independent covenant" and a subsequent breach of that independent undertaking
i.e. nonpayment of labor and material claims, gave rise to a cause of action but did
not afford the city any ground for avoiding the contract. From this, the court reasoned that the city had no right to use the retained fund for payment of labor and material claims; and if the city had no right to use the funds in that manner, the surety
had no right to the funds either.
In McHasco, Justice Rogosheske distinguished the Burns case on the grounds that
it lacked a provision for satisfaction of all creditors' claims as a condition precedent
to final payment, a condition clearly present in McHasco and held that National
Surety Company v. Berggren2l was controlling. In Berggren, there were similar claims
of priority advanced by the surety and the assignee bank under similar facts. The
court held for the surety, stating that the bank could not have priority without being
legally bound to advance funds to the contractor. The majority in McHasco found
that the surety rendered the performance necessary to compel final payment by satisfying the contractor's obligations to both the municipalities and the labor and
materialmen. By the surety's performance, it was subrogated to the rights of all parties to whom it performed. Since the municipalities had the right to use the funds to
pay unsatisfied claims, the surety gained the municipalities' right. The labor and materialmen also had a right to the fund because it was created partly for their protection. The surety gained this right. The court recognized that the surety was benefited
to the extent that the bank's loans were used to pay the creditors' claims, and concluded that the bank and the surety had an equitable interest in the fund. In examining the nature of each interest, the court found that the bank relied on the contractor's rights who, by default, forfeited the right to final payment; while the surety
acted under compulsion of the bond, and was thus subrogated to the prior rights of
the owner and the contractor's creditors.
As the recent United States Supreme Court case of Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance, Co.22 reaffirmed PrairieState2 s and Henningsen, 4 so McHasco reaffirms the old's Ibid.

"Seaboard Sur. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., supra note 16, at 290.
126 Minn. 188, 148 N.W. 55 (1942).
mSupra note 16.
2Supra note 5.
Prairie State Bank v. United States, supra note 11.
"Henningsen v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., supra note 11.
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er cases 25 which make up the Minnesota rule. Judge Whitaker of the Court of Claims
observed in United Pacific Insurance Company v. United States26 that due to the
confusion concerning the status of PrairieState and Henningsen the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in order to settle the question. In Pearlman, the Supreme Court
reviewed and analyzed its prior decisions and concluded that there had been no
repudiation of "the equitable principles so deeply imbedded in our commercial practices, our economy, and our law as spelled out in the Prairie Bank and Henningsen
cases." 27 The Court went on to hold:
the Government had a right to use the retained fund to pay laborers and materialmen; that the laborers and materialmen had a right to be paid out of the
fund; that the contractor, had he completed his job and paid his laborers and
materialmen, would have become entitled to the fund, and the surety, having
paid the laborers and materialmen, is entitled to the benefit of all these rights to
the extent necessary to reimburse it.28
National Surety Corporationv. United States, 29 involved a contest between surety
companies on a defaulting contractor's bond and an assignee bank under the 1940
Assignment of Claims Act.3 0 The court, in referring to the Henningsen case, held
that while the United States was under no legal obligation to protect labor and materialmen, it was under an equitable obligation to do so, and the surety became subrogated to the right of the United States to apply withheld funds to the payment of
these creditors' claims which right was superior to the bank's right. In Newark Insurance Company v. United States,3' the surety, upon learning that certain creditors
of the contractor were not being paid, requested the Government to hold back further payments until an investigation could be made. Subsequent to this, however,
the Government made final payments on the contract to an assignee bank. The surety, which incurred a loss on its bond, sued the Government for the final payment.
The court, in denying the Government's motion for summary judgement, stated that
if it appeared that the Government, after being informed of the surety's equitable
interest in the money, paid it to a party other than the surety without good reason,
the surety would be entitled to recover.
McHasco and the other recent cases just mentioned are part of a current trend to
reinforce the surety's position in the commercial world. But where does this leave
the assignee bank? The court in McHasco enunciated what appears to be the current disposition toward the assignee bank-the bank is in a better position than the
surety to protect itself from loss. 8 2 According to the court, all the bank need do is refuse to advance funds without the surety's consent. This puts a bank which is under
no obligation to advance funds in an advantageous bargaining position. If the conSee cases cited supra note 16.
162 Ct. CI. 361, 319 F.2d 893, 895 (1963).
Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., supra note 5, at 140.
21Id.

at 141.

29 Supra

note 5.
'°65 Stat. 41 (19511); 31 U.S.C. §203 (1964).
'7144 Ct. Cl. 655, 169 F. Supp. 955 (1959).
'First Nat'l Bank v. McHasco Elec. Co., supra note 2, at 494.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. XVI

tractor, while performing, needs working capital in order to complete performance,
it must get the advance from somewhere or it is faced with default, forcing the surety
to absorb the loss. Thus, if the situation just described is presented to the surety,
the surety is faced with the alternatives of consenting to at least a partial assignment
or being faced with absorption of the loss on the contract. On the other hand, the
situation might present itself where the surety will not consent to an assignment.
This is where the "Minnesota rule" falls short. Under the rule, if the bank does
make advances without the requisite legal obligation or the surety's consent, it runs
the risk of the contractor defaulting and the surety receiving priority to any withheld
funds. This is inequitable; for both the surety and the bank by their respective expenditures have contributed to the fund. The equities are balanced only when the
surety and the bank are allowed to participate in the fund to the extent that their
contributions held it intact. For example, if the bank advanced $50,000 for the payment of the labor and materialmen and the surety absorbed a $50,000 loss upon the
contractor's default, both should be allowed to participate in the fund equally. In
practice though, it is much more likely that the surety will consent to a partial assignment to the bank, and to the extent that this situation prevails, the "Minnesota rule"
is workable in the commercial world.

Torts-Libel and Slander-Extension of the New York Times v. Sullivan

Rule-Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.
1966).

internationally famous scientist and winner of the Nobel Prize in
Chemistry and the Nobel Peace Prize, has been active in the last decade in efforts
to promote an international nuclear test ban treaty. In 1960, the St. Louis GlobeDemocrat published an editorial which criticized Pauling's activities. The editorial
stated that Pauling had been cited for contempt of Congress when in truth he had
never been cited for such contempt. Pauling brought a libel action against the St.
Louis Globe-Democrat Publishing Company, publisher of the newspaper. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed the action,
and Pauling appealed. The Court of Appeals of the Eight Circuit, affirming, held:2
Where a private citizen, not acting as a public official, has by his activities projected
himself into the arena of public policy, public controversy, and "pressing public
concern" the principle of New York Times v. Sullivan3 is applicable.
The Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan4 marked the initial
LINUS PAULING,

I2 The dismissal was

not accompanied by an opinion.
Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966).
3376 U.S. 254 (1964).
' Ibid.
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application of the first amendment's protection of speech and the press to defamatory libel.5 The Court therein held that a public official may recover damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct only if he proves that the statement was made with actual malice-that is with knowledge that the statement was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 6 The New York Times
decision, the Court pointed out, was prompted by "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust
7
and wide open."
In Rosenblatt v. Baer8 the Supreme Court again took up the issues of the New York
Times case. The Court, limiting itself to the points argued, held that the question
whether the plaintiff was a "public official" within the New York Times rule was not
to be answered under state law standards. 9 The Court, expanding on its commitment to the principle of free debate on public issues in the New York Times case,
stated that a strong interest exists, first, in debate on public issues and, second, in
debate about those persons who are in a position to significantly influence the resolution of those issues, which must be protected.1o
In reaching its conclusion the court in the present case recognized that the New
York Times case dealt only with public officials, and overcame the argument that the
rule of the case should be limited to public officials by showing first, that the Supreme
Court favored expansion of the New York Times rule," and second that the Supreme Court specifically denied in Rosenblatt that it was tying the New York Times
12
rule to the rule of official privilege.
The court then, drawing a comparison between public officials and private citi-

5 Id.at 268.
a Id. at 293-94.
7
Id. at 270.
8383 U.S. 75 (1966).
OId. at 84-85.
'0 Id. at 85.
a1Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., supra note 2, at 193-94. The Court cited two
significant footnotes, one from the New York Times case and one from the Rosenblatt case,
in support of its position. In Times the Supreme Court had said:
We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the ranks of government employees the "public official" designation would extend for purposes of the rule or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not be included.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
In Rosenblatt the Supreme Court had said:
We are treating here only the element of public position, since that is all that has been
argued and briefed. We intimate no view whatever whether there are other basis for
applying the New York Times standards-for example that in a particular case, the interest in reputation are relatively insubstantial, because the subject of discussion has thrust
himself into the vortex of the discussion of a question of pressing public concern.
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86, n. 12 (1966).
2Id.
at 196. Again the court turned to a footnote to support its position. The court cited
footnote 10 of the Rosenblatt case:
We reject any suggestion that our reference in New York Times, 376 U.S. at 282, 283,
n.23 ....
to Barr it. Matteo 360 U.S. 564 mean that we have tied the New York Times rule
to the rule of official privilege. The interests protected by the New York Times rule are
interests in discussion, not retaliation.
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 n.10 (1966).
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zens who project themselves into the public arena, stated that lobbyists, heads of
pressure groups and public figures like Dr. Paulings may possess at least as great a
capacity for influencing public policy as a minor public official who is clearly subject to the New York Times rule. 14 The court realized that criticism of these private
citizens is at least as important to the public interest as criticism of public officials' 6
and concluded that if the New York Times rule is to effectively promote debate on
public issues, it must also be applicable to private citizens who seek to influence
public policy.16
The New York Times case, as it involved a major departure from the pre-existing
law has initiated substantial litigation, the majority of which favors expansion of its
holding.' 7 The question whether the rule can be extended to private citizens has
arisen in a number of cases.
In the only other federal court of appeals decision on this point, the Second Circuit in Pauling v. News Syndicate Corp.,18 another defamation suit brought by Dr.
Pauling, said in dicta that the New York Times rule should be extended to participants in any public debate on issues which are of "grave public concern."' 9
However, the district courts are in conflict. The district courts in Eastern Kentucky2 0 and Connecticut 2 ' on one hand have extended the rule to private citizens,
while the district courts of Southern New York 22 and the District of Columbia 23 have
declined to extend the rule beyond public officials.
The state courts are also split on the application of the New York Times rule. The
New York courts have decided a substantial number of cases which involved the extension of the rule. While they have generally held for extension, the courts have
differed as to when and to whom the rule should be extended.
Thus in a case brought by a law partner of a candidate for mayor2 4 and in a case
brought by Dr. Pauling, 25 the New York courts held the New York Times rule to be
applicable. However, the New York courts have declined to extend the rule to a

Dr. Pauling became concerned about the destructive effects of possible nuclear wars in
1946. It was his dominating interest for the last twenty years and during that period he
has given over 750 lectures concerning atomic weapons and the need to prevent a nuclear
war. He has travelled throughout the world giving lectures and pressing his views on
heads of states, ambassadors and other public officials. His efforts have gained him such
prominence in this field that he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
Pauling v. National Review Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 982-83, 269 N.Y.S. 2d 11, 17-18 (1966).
14
Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., supra, note 2,at 196.
'

2Ibid.
1

1 1Id.at

196-97.
7Id.at 196, and the cases cited therein.
18335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 968 (1965).
'8 1d. at 671.
21Walker v. Courier Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
"Brennan v. Associated Press, - F. Supp. - (D. Conn. 1966).
Frigrole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
n Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188 (D.D.C. 1965).
",Gilberg v. Gioffi, 21 App. Div.2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823, aff'd., 15 N.Y.2d 1023, 260 N.Y.S.2d
29, 207 N.E.2d 620 (1965).
2 Pauling v. National Review Co., 49 Misc.2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d
11 (1966).
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Russian Count;26 to a famous pugilist; 27 to a noted baseball player;28 and to a radio
29
and television performer.
In other state court actions the Colorado30 and Alaska s ' Supreme Courts have ex88
tended the rule to private citizens, while the Texas32 and New Hampshire courts
have declined to extend the rule. The Texas case is of especial interest because it
arose out of the same report as did the Colorado and Eastern Kentucky cases, supra,
and reached a conclusion contrary to these cases.3 4 The Supreme Court will have
35
the last say as it has granted a petition for certiorari on the case.
In all of the cases cited, the courts make an honest effort to determine the scope of
the Supreme Court's ruling in the New York Times case. The division is understandable however when it is considered that the majority of the cases were decided before
the Rosenblatt case.
In the New York Times case, the Court in support of its position cited Barr v.
Matteo386 reasoning that since under the Barrcase public officials are protected against
suits by private citizens for defamatory statements made by the public officials in
their official capacity, then private citizens should be protected against suits by pub38
lic officials acting in their official capacity.37 While the Court by a footnote attempted
to show that the rationale of the New York Times case was intended to apply to oth9
ers than public officials, the meaning of the footnote is questionables and before
40
Rosenblatt was decided only the Walker v. Courier Journal and Louisville Times
court relied on the footnote to support their application of the New York Times
rule to a private citizen. The majority of the courts, however, relied on the Barr v.
Matteo analogy41 as the basis for their refusal to extend the New York Times case
beyond the public official concept. It was not until the Rosenblatt case that the Supreme Court specifically denied that its reference to Barr v. Matteo42 in the New

- Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 48 Misc.2d 700, 265 N.Y.S.2d 754
(1965).
2Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186, aff'd 22 App. Div.2d 854,
254 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1964).
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1964), aff'd 23 App.
Div.2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965).
Faulk v. Aware Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 954, 253 N.Y.S.2d 990, 202 N.E.2d 372 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 916 (1965).
30Walker v. Associated Press, 417 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1966).
tm
Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Alaska 1966).
Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
Powell v. Monitor Publishing Co., 217 A.2d 193 (N.H. 1966).
Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., supra note 31.
35 U.S.L. WEEK 3124 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1966).
360 U.S. 564 (1959).
'3 New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 282-83.
8Id. at n. 23.
Indeed, in arguing that certiorari should not be granted in Associated Press v. Walker,
counsel for General Walker cited the footnote in support of their position that the New York
Times rule should be limited to public officials. Response to petition for certiorari, Associated
Pressv. Walker (No. 150, 1966 Term.).
,0Supra note 20.
1 Supra note 6.
Ibid.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. XVI

York Times case was intended to show that the New York Times rule was limited
48
to public officials.
45
The courts in Walker v. Associated Press,44 Pauling v. National Review, Inc.,
4
Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co. 6 and the present case are the only courts to
consider whether the New York Times rule should be extended to others than public officials since Rosenblatt was handed down and in every case Rosenblatt was cited
and the New York Times rule was extended to private citizens.
"The thrust of the New York Times rule," the Supreme Court said in the Rosenblatt case, 47 "is that when interests in public discussion are particularly strong. ...the
Constitution limits the protection afforded by the law of defamation." The amount
of litigation and conflict on the issue of the present case alone points to the need
of more definite standards by which the courts can effectively protect "interests in
public discussions".
Justice Black in his concurrances in New York Times and Rosenblatt has given
that standard when he said "an unconditional right to say what one pleases about
public affairs is what I consider to be the minimum guarantee of the first amendment". 48 The Supreme Court has said that the purpose of the first amendment is to
protect freedom of expression on public questions.49 Libel laws, however, hamper
this freedom 0 and if the Supreme Court is to be consistent it must recognize Justice
Black's standard and hold libel laws inapplicable at a minimum to discussions of
public affairs.
The court in the present case, while bound by the actual malice limitation of the
New York Times case,51 closely approached Justice Black's standard in its interpretation of the applicability of the New York Times rule and on this point is consistent
with the first amendment's protection of free speech.

Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., supra note 12.
"Supra note 30.
,5Supra note 25.
" Supra note 31.
'7Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra note 8, at 86.
,8 New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 297.
' 9 The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured
by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The Constitutional
safeguard, we have said "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."
New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 269. See also cases cited therein.
50Errors of fact particularly in regard to a man's mental states and processes, are inevitable. Information and discussion will be discouraged and the public interest in public
knowledge of important facts will be poorly defended if error subjects its author to a
libel suit.... Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate.
Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1942). Quoted with approval in New York Times
v. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 272.
The Supreme Court gave no indication in the Rosenblatt case that it was altering its
position on the issue of actual malice. The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to review
its stand on the malice issue because the Texas Court in Associated Press v. Walker, supra
note 32, found that there was actual malice in the reporting. See Justice Black's dissent in
Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra note 8, at 87 for an interesting argument as to the effect of the
actual malice requirement.
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Trusts-Revocation by Settlor/ Life Beneficiary-Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank,
361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

IN

1923

ANNA

P.

HATCH CRtEATED

an irrevocable spendthrift trust, income to herself

for life and on her death the corpus to whomever she appointed by will, or on the
failure to appoint, to her next of kin. 1 In 1963 the settlor, life beneficiary, sought to
obtain a modification order whereby she would receive an additional $5000 per year
from the corpus. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied relief and granted a summary judgment for defendant trustees. 2 The Court of
3
Appeals affirmed.
Counsel for Hatch relied on the doctrine of worthier title to claim that the heirs
had no interest and Anna Hatch could therefore revoke, amend, or modify as she
saw fit. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the doctrine of worthier title is no
longer held to be either a rule of law or one of construction in the District of Columbia. On the contrary, "any act or words of the settlor which would validly create a
remainder interest in a named third party may create a valid remainder interest in
the settlor's heirs.' 4 Thus the court reached the conclusion that Anna Hatch could
not unilaterally terminate the trust on the theory set forth, but the court went on to
give a detailed explanation of how she could attain her end in a way that might be
acceptable to the courts of the District of Columbia. 5 Since all trusts are revocable,
regardless of declarations to the contrary, if the settlor and all beneficiaries agree to
the revocation, 6 the only thing preventing a modification or revocation in the instant
case was the impossibility of obtaining the permission of the yet to be determined
7
next of kin.
The court suggested that this difficulty could be overcome if the settlor could show
that those who would be her next of kin, if they were determined at the time the action was brought, agreed to the termination and, if she were to show that the interests of unborn beneficiaries were adequately protected. If such a showing was made,
the court could then appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the unborn contingent remaindermen. 8 The court further suggested that the settlor's position would
be strengthened if she were to offer a quid pro quo to the prospective heirs for, their
consent to a termination. 9 The heirs could trade their qualified interest for an absolute interest. 0
Looked upon separately, the suggested procedures are not without precedent. In
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a large number of states representation of unborn and unascertained heirs is provided for by statute. 1r The Illinois statute permits a court to appoint a guardian ad
litem for any infant or insane defendant in a cause in equity "whether a trust is
involved or not," or for any person not in being whom it appears might become entitled to any future interest, legal or equitable.' 2 "The representative shall have the
power to bind the party he represents as though such party were a party to the suit." 8
Where there is no legislative fiat, however, there is some doubt as to whether a court
of equity has this power inherently.' 4 By the better view it does.15 The problem of
how to revoke or modify a trust where there is a gift over to a class is less difficult.
Here the doctrine of virtual representation6 is applicable and courts are generally
not so reluctant to state that the interests of unborn and unascertained heirs are
7
adequately represented by the already born members of the same class.'
The court in the instant case, however, went beyond the generally accepted theories
and justifications for the use of a guardian ad litem. Anna Hatch was seeking modification based on the worthier title doctrine. In effect she was saying that she had
the power to modify because she never gave anything-the remainder to her heirs
was actually a reversion in herself. She merely wanted more money than she had
originally provided for herself.' 8 If an action is brought based on the theory suggested
by the court, it will be interesting to see if that theory will be accepted despite the
lack of necessity of adjudicating the rights of parties. No rights are brought into
issue here. The validity of the trust is not questioned. The action is merely one of
convenience to the settlor/life beneficiary. Query whether such is ground for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem?
Where the court is under no duty to adjudicate conflicting claims of parties to the
trust, can it still appoint a guardian ad litem who will have the power to waive the
rights of the unborn contingent remaindermen? In the instant case these rights
are not merely contingent on the determination of the next of kin, but also
they are subject to defeasance in the event that the settlor decides to exercise her
testamentary power of appointment. It would seem that where such a situation exists it would be more valuable to the unborn heirs were they to have an absolute
interest which could not be defeated. This is where the court's suggestion of a quid
pro quo becomes relevant.' 9 As the court suggests, the unborn contingent remainder-

n See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. c. 22, § 6 (1964); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 373.5; N.Y. DECED. Fsr.
§ 19; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-11 (1950). See generally POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 296 n.79
(1966).
2
ILL. Rav. STAT. c. 22, § 6 (1964).
IIbid
,Moxley v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 154 P.2d 417 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945), aff'd, 27 Cal.2d
457, 165 P.2d 15 (1946).
15Mabry v. Scott, 51 Cal. App. 2d 245, 124 P.2d 659 (1942), cert. denied, Title Ins. Trust v.
Mabry, 317 U.S. 670 (1943); Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Barlow, 235 S.C. 488, 112 S.E.2d 396 (1960);
27 AM. JUR. Infants § 120 (1940).
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men, acting through a guardian ad litem, could agree to an increase in the annual
income of the life beneficiary in return for the life beneficiary's ageement to transfer
assets in trust for the benefit of the heirs, without a retention of the power to appoint by will.20 As a result of such an agreement the heirs could have an absolute interest in addition to or in place of their presently qualified interest. As said by the
court: "The pattern of such a modification is clearly available where the remaindermen of a trust are recognizable as a class even though the members of the class are
21
not now individually ascertainable."
That statement by the court. is clearly sound where the validity of the trust is challenged. In Mabry v. Scott, 22 which the Court of Appeals cites as authority for the proposition that the power to appoint a guardian ad litem is an inherent one of every
court, the settlor alleged fraud, undue influence, and failure of consideration, and
sought to have the trust set aside on those grounds. The complaint was later amended
to allege mistake of fact on the part of the settlor, 23 but in any event, a case was presented which the court had a duty to adjudicate. The validity of the trust was challenged. The California District Court of Appeal felt constrained to act. But in so
doing the court required that a condition be met for a court to act in such a case:
there must be an allegation of mistake, or inferentially, some allegation of fraud,
duress, or undue influence such as to warrant the exercise of the powers of a court
of equity in relieving the settlor from covenants and conditions which otherwise
24
would not have been made.
So too in Tennessee, courts require that there be an adversary proceeding. In the
case of Rodgers v. Unborn Child or Children of Rodgers,25 the life tenant of property in which children born to her were named as remaindermen, sought to have the
fee vested in her because of the unlikelihood that she would have any children (she
was 46 years old and unmarried), or, in the alternative, to have the property sold
and the value of the remainder interest set aside out of the proceeds. The Supreme
Court of Tennessee refused to grant the life tenant's request on the grounds that the
case was not an adversary proceeding such as to require the court to adjudicate the
rights of parties. 2 6 The court did not deny its power, even in the absence of statute,
to act for the benefit of persons under a disability, whether in esse or in posse, and
irrespective of whether the estate in question is vested or contingent. But a neces-

20Ibid.
11Id. at 566.
"Mabry v. Scott, supra note 15.
2 Id. at 246, 124 P.2d at 662.
2
lId. at 247, 124 P.2d at 663. The court in speaking of the doctrine of virtual representation said:
The reason behind the exception [to the rule of indispensable parties] is a simple one
of human relationships, implicit in the principle that human laws, and all other temporal
things, are for the living; not for the dead or for those not yet in being, if to hold otherwise would result in injustice to living persons. Because parties are not in being, and
therefore cannot be brought before the tribunal, is not sufficient reason for a court to
stand by, helpless and impotent, when rights of living persons, in ordinary common sense
ought to be adjudicated.
25Rodgers v. Unborn Child or Children of Rodgers, 204 Tenn. 96, 315 S.W.2d 521 (1958).
2Id.
at 99, 315 S.W.2d at 526.
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sary condition for the exercise of this power was that there be a cause of action sta27
ted for which relief could be granted.
Thus, if the life tenant in the Rodgers case were to have framed an issue in her
icomplaint which would have required adjudication, the Supreme Court of Tennes'see would have felt constrained to act. But in viewing the action
as ex parte, and
basically as one of convenience to the life tenant, the court could not vest the fee
in the life tenant because the decree would not have been binding on any persons
not parties to the suit.28 The afterborn remaindermen would have an action against
the life tenant's purchaser. Under the rule in Rodgers, Anna Hatch's action would
be viewed as an ex parte one despite the naming of trustees as defendants since there
was no true controversy which demanded that the court act. Despite a decree by the
court allowing Hatch to terminate the trust, contingent remaindermen might have
a cause of action against the trustees for diminishing the value of their interest.
In New York this problem of how to terminate an irrevocable trust is solved by
statute.2 9 Revocation of a trust is possible upon the consent of all persons beneficially
interested, and a gift or limitation to heirs of the settlors does not create a beneficial
interest in such persons8 0 In the case of In re PeabodyS' the terms of the trust were,
to settlor for life then to such beneficiaries as she by will might appoint, and in default of appointment to her surviving issue, 82 and if none, to various alternative takers. The settlor was pregnant and wished to amend the trust. The trustees were unwilling to permit this as a result of settlor's condition. The New York Court of Appeals held that a child en ventre sa mere is not a person beneficially interested in
the trust, and such child's consent was not necessary under the statute.88 Under New
York law therefore, Anna Hatch would have no difficulty in obtaining a court's permission to modify as she wished. She would merely be required to make a declaration to the trustees that she wished to modify. No other parties are beneficially interested under the statute, and no one else's consent is required.
The key question then is would a decree of the District Court for the District of
Columbia permitting the termination of the Anna Hatch trust, in the absence of a
real controversy, be binding on contingent remaindermen who were represented by
ft Ibid.
Id.at 97, 315 S.W.2d at 524.
N.Y. Pas. PNop.LAw § 23:
Upon the written consent of all persons beneficially interested in a trust in personal
property or any part thereof heretofore or hereafter created, the creator of such trust
may revoke the same as to the whole or such part thereof, and thereupon the estate of
the trustee shall cease in the whole or such part thereof.
For the purposes of this section, a gift or limitation, contained in a trust created on
or after September first 1951, in favor of a class of persons described only as heirs or next
of kin or distributees of the creator of the trust, or by other words of like import, does not
create a beneficial interest in such persons.
so Ibid.
0 In re Peabody, 5 N.Y.2d 541, 158 N.E.2d 841, 186 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1959).
OIn re Decker, 13 Misc. 2d 121, 177 N.Y.S.2d 598 (App. Div. 1958). The corpus was to go
to testamentary appointees, in the failure of appointment to settlor's next of kin. The trust
was created prior to Sept. 1, 1951, and therefore the settlor could not revoke. N.Y. PERS. PROP.
LAw § 23. But the court said that if the trust had been created after that date the settlor
would have been the only person interested and could have revoked at will.
nIn re Peabody, supra note 31, at 544, 158 N.E.2d at 845, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
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a guardian ad litem, but who were not parties of necessity to a real controversy?
Under the Tennessee and California cases, and by the weight of authority,3 4 the answer would seem to be no.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has suggested a method by
which a settlor can revoke an irrevocable trust. The method is simple and promotes
the free alienability of property. It seems equitable to allow a settlor/life beneficiary
to reach the corpus in a case where the trust was originally created primarily for
her own benefit. As a result of legislative action such a result could be achieved in
New York. 35 But in the absence of statute, most courts would hold that the trust could
not be terminated. It would at least be necessary for the party seeking the termination to present a prima facie case challenging the validity of the trust. Then the
court would be compelled to appoint a guardian ad litem and/or rely on the doctrine of virtual representation to protect the interests of unborn and unascertained
contingent remaindermen. And since challenging the trust would place in issue the
rights of contingent remaindermen, they would be bound by the decision.
The Court of Appeals' approach to the problem is frank and straight-forward,
though novel.3 6 Doctrines of mistake are so indefinite that it is usually not difficult to
present a prima facie case. The solution suggested in the instant case obviates the
necessity of circuitous pleading and deals with the true problem. However, until
the suggested plan is actually approved by a court, and until that decision is challenged unsuccessfully by a contingent remainderman whose interest in the trust was
diminished, trustees and guardians ad litem will not rest easy.

"3 ScO-r, TRuSTs § 340 (2d ed. 1956); SIMES &SMITH,
N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAw

§ 23.

FUTuRE INTERES

§ 1805 (2d ed. 1956).

"Although the question was not considered by the court, serious tax problems could result
if the court's method of termination were adopted. If the corpus of an irrevocable trust is
tax free to the income beneficiary because it cannot be reached, why should it not be taxable
if it can be reached with relative ease?

